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I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last twenty years, the commercial development of the
Internet has led to an age of unprecedented information sharing. The
Web provides an incredibly immersive and interactive platform for
knowledge sharing. Perfect copies of images, videos and sound
recordings can easily be downloaded, reproduced and redistributed to
millions of people around the world. For the first time in history,
authors are empowered to share their creative genius directly with the
world and doing so in a manner that is entirely consistent with the
purpose of copyright—”to Promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.”1
Not surprisingly, the rapid expansion of the Internet has
outpaced the evolution of U.S. copyright law. The two principal legal
1.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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instruments governing copyrights—the U.S. Copyright Act and the
Berne Convention—were drafted and enacted prior to widespread use
of the Internet. The ease with which works are now published,
downloaded, copied, and distributed would have been unimaginable
to the drafters of today’s Copyright Act.
The ability to publish works on the Internet has resulted in
unintended consequences. In particular, the definition of “United
States works” in § 101 of the Copyright Act is outdated in the Internet
age. Specifically, when foreign works are “published” on the Internet
they are “simultaneously” published in the United States. As a result a
foreign work is a “United States work” according to the present
definition. As a United States work, the work is subject to the
registration requirement of § 411(a). Therefore, the copyright holder
must register the work with the U.S. Copyright Office prior to filing a
civil action for copyright infringement. As this Article will discuss,
the U.S. registration requirement of § 411(a) is an impermissible
formality which violates the Berne Convention.
In restoring compliance, we must consider what works of foreign
origin should be deemed “United States works” upon simultaneous
Internet publication. This Article recommends that works of foreign
origin should still be included in the definition of “United States
works” when the copyright holder actively solicits customers in the
United States via the Internet. All other simultaneous publications
involving foreign works should be excluded. Implementation of this
solution will eliminate the impermissible formality for the class
protected by the Berne Convention while maintaining a level playing
field with foreign competitors who avail themselves of the U.S.
market.
Part II of this Article provides background on the Berne
Convention and its implementation in U.S. Copyright Law. Part III
discusses the current statutory framework governing publication,
followed by a detailed analysis of case law regarding distribution and
publication on the Internet that spans from 1993 to 2011. Part IV
identifies aspects of current law that are not in compliance with the
Berne Convention and recommends solutions to restore compliance
with the Convention.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention (the Convention),2 initially signed by ten
countries in 1886,3 remains the principal international copyright
treaty. Today, its membership spans 166 nations including the United
States.4 The Convention was born out of the desire “to promote
creativity by protecting the works of the mind” and to do so
universally.5 To address this need, the Convention is designed to help
nationals of its member States acquire international protection for
their “right to control, and [to] receive payment for, the use of their
[literary and artistic works].”6
The Convention is administered by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO)7 and was most recently amended by
the Paris Act in 1971.8
1. Territoriality & National Treatment Under the Berne
Convention
The concepts of territoriality and national treatment control the
level of protection a work garners under the Convention. Article 5
specifies that domestic law governs the protection of works,

2. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
amended Sept. 28, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf.
3. 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND ¶ 2.51, at 82 (2d ed. 2006).
The initial signatory countries included Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Haiti, Italy, Liberia,
Switzerland, the U.K., and Tunisia. Id.
4. See id. at 85 (“[T]he Convention has continued to be the centerpiece of the
international copyright system . . . .”); Treaties Statistics: Berne Convention for the Protection
of
Literary
and
Artistic
Works,
WORLD
INTELL.
PROPERTY
ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/statistics/StatsResults.jsp?treaty_id=15&lang=en (last visited
Mar. 26, 2013) (providing number of contracting parties). The United States joined the Berne
Convention effective March 1, 1989. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) [hereinafter BCIA] (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C. (2011)).
5. WIPO Treaties—General Information, WORLD INTELL. PROPERTY ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) [hereinafter WIPO
Treaties].
6. See id.; Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 1. The term “‘literary and artistic works’
shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the
mode or form of its expression . . . .” Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(1).
7. See WIPO Treaties, supra note 5.
8. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 3, § 3.66, at 131.
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regardless of the author’s nationality.9 In the country of origin,
“[authors] shall enjoy . . . the same rights as national authors.”10 In a
member state other than the country of origin, “[a]uthors shall
enjoy . . . the rights which [that country’s] respective laws . . . grant to
their nationals.”11 In other words, the basic protection scheme is one
of anti-discrimination against authors from other countries. Failure of
a member nation to provide such equal protection constitutes a
violation of the Convention.
2. Absence of Formalities under the Berne Convention
The Convention prohibits formalities that interfere with the
author’s rights. Article 5 of the Convention provides that “[t]he
enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any
formality.”12 In other words, when an author claims protection for her
work in a member country, this protection cannot be subjected to any
formality.13 The drafters of the Convention defined formalities as
legal requirements imposed on authors in order to ensure that the
rights of the author came into existence.14 More precisely, registration
and deposit requirements were expressly identified as formalities
prohibited under the Convention.15
B. The United States Implementation of the Berne Convention
The United States joined the Berne Convention on March 1,
1989,16 more than one hundred years after the treaty was first
established. Before that date, the United States was not eligible for
9. See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(1), (3).
10. Id. art. 5(3). The country of origin depends on where the work is published:
(1) If first published in a member country, that country is deemed the country of origin. See
id. art. 5(4)(a).
(2) If simultaneously published in several member countries, the country of origin is the
country with the shortest term of protection. See id.
(3) If simultaneously published in a nonmember country and a member country, the country
of origin is the member country. See id. art. 5(4)(b).
(4) If first published in a nonmember country, without simultaneous publication in a member
country, the country of origin is the member country of which the author is a national. See id.
art. 5(4)(c).
11. Id. art. 5(1).
12. Id. art. 5(2).
13. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 3, § 6.92, at 312.
14. See id. § 6.102, at 323.
15. See id. (“[T]he word ‘formalities’ has been taken as synonymous with the term
‘formal conditions,’ comprising, for example, registrations, deposit, etc. . . . .” (emphasis added)
(quoting Dr. Meyer, a German delegate [find the source of the quote]) ).
16. BCIA, sec. 13(a),102 Stat. at 2861.
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membership, in part because of the existence of the notice and
registration requirements in U.S. copyright law17—formalities
prohibited by the Convention.18 In 1989, Congress resolved the issue
by eliminating the notice requirement for all works and excluding
“Berne Convention works” from the registration requirement.19
1. Notice and Registration before the Berne Convention
Implementation Act
From 1909 to 1989, authors were required to affix notice of
copyright upon each published copy as a prerequisite for federal
copyright protection.20 As a consequence, works published without
notice automatically fell into the public domain.21 During the same
period, copyright registration was required for “any work” as a
prerequisite to filing an infringement action.22 Notably, by requiring
registration for “any work,” registration was therefore required for
foreign works.
2. Notice & Registration after the Berne Convention
Implementation Act
Effective March 1, 1989, the Berne Convention Implementation
Act of 1988 (BCIA) brought U.S. copyright law into compliance with
the Convention, enabling the United States to become a member of
the Union.
Compliance with the Convention required the elimination of
prohibited formalities. To meet this need, Congress eliminated the

17. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2576-77, 2583 (1976)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. (2011)); Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320,
35 Stat. 1075, 1077-78, (1909) (repealed 1976).
18. See supra text accompanying note 15.
19. See BCIA, secs. 4(a), 5, 9, 102 Stat. at 2854-57, 2859.
20. See Copyright Act of 1976, § 401(a), (c), 90 Stat. at 2576-77 (“Whenever a work . . .
is published[,] . . . a notice shall be affixed to the copies . . . to give reasonable notice of the
claim of copyright.”); Copyright Act of 1909, sec. 9, 35 Stat. at 1077 (“[A]ny person . . . may
secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright . . . and such
notice shall be affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale in the United
States . . . .”).
21. R.W. Beck, Inc. v. E3 Consulting, LLC, 577 F.3d 1133, 1143 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting
that material published before February 28, 1989, ordinarily was deemed to be dedicated to the
public domain if it lacked a copyright notice).
22. See Copyright Act of 1976, § 411(a), 90 Stat. at 2583 (“[N]o action for infringement
of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been
made . . . .”); Copyright Act of 1909, sec. 12, 35 Stat. at 1078 (“No action or proceeding shall be
maintained for infringement of copyright in any work until . . . the deposit of copies and
registration of such work shall have been complied with.”).
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notice requirement for all works.23 In addition, Congress excluded
“Berne Convention works” (works of foreign origin) from the
registration requirement.24 Eliminating the registration requirement
only for Berne Convention works was an intentionally minimalistic
approach to compliance.25 In doing so, Congress preserved the
registration requirement for works originating in the United States.
3. From “Berne Convention Works” to “United States
Works”
On October 28, 1998,26 Congress adopted the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Title I of which contained
amendments to implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty.27 Like the Berne Convention,
the new WIPO treaties required United States protection on a
“formality-free basis.”28 As such, the exclusion of “Berne Convention
works” from the registration requirement needed to be expanded to
encompass works protected under the WIPO treaties.
To accomplish this, Congress replaced the language excluding
“Berne Convention works” from registration29 with affirmative
language requiring registration only for “United States works.”30 The
23. See BCIA, sec. 7, 102 Stat. at 2857-58 (replacing the obligatory language in 17
U.S.C. §§ 402, 403 (1988) of a notice of copyright “shall be placed” on all copies and publically
distributed phonorecords with the optional language of “may be placed”) (emphasis added).
24. See id. sec. 9(b), at 2859 (replacing the term of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988) “any work”
with “[e]xcept for actions for infringement of copyright in Berne Convention works whose
country of origin is not the United States”) (emphasis added). A work is a “Berne Convention
work” if in the case of a published work:
(1) one or more of the authors is a national of a nation adhering to the Convention on the
date of first publication;
(2) the work is first published in a nation adhering to the Convention;
(3) simultaneously first published in a nation adhering to the Convention and in a foreign
nation that does not adhere to the Convention. See id. sec. 4(a), at 2854.
25. See S. REP. NO. 100-17, at 54 (1988) (statement of John Uilkema, Chairman of the
American Bar Association’s Section of Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law) (“We are
satisfied that a minimalist legislative approach—i.e., doing only so much as is necessary to
render the U.S. law compatible with Berne Convention—is appropriate. This is the approach
taken by the House and the Senate . . . .”).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (specifying effective date of 1998 amendments as of October
28, 1998).
27. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
[hereinafter DMCA].
28. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 15 (1998).
29. See BCIA, sec. 9(b), 102 Stat. at 2859 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1998) with the
language “[e]xcept for actions for infringement of copyright in Berne Convention works whose
country of origin is not the United States . . . .”) (emphasis added).
30. See DMCA, Pub. L. 105-304, sec. 102, 112 Stat. at 2863, (amending 17 U.S.C.
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registration requirement language of § 411(a) has remained
unchanged since the enactment of the DMCA.
III. REGISTRATION AND FOREIGN WORKS
A. Statutory Framework
1. Registration for Any “United States Work”
Under the current statutory framework, a “United States work”
must be registered prior to the filing of a civil action for copyright
infringement.31 As discussed above, Congress intentionally amended
§ 411(a) to exclude foreign works from this requirement.32 Doing so
was necessary to gain membership in the Berne Convention and
subsequent WIPO copyright treaties.33 Both treaties require domestic
protection of foreign works on a formality-free basis.34 Currently,
only authors of “United States works” are required to register prior to
filing a copyright action.
There is significant public policy benefit associated with
registration. While drafting the Berne Convention Implementation
Act, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary considered the option of
eliminating § 411(a).35 However, the Senate maintained this
requirement for United States works in order to preserve the
following benefits:
(1)

Registration promotes efficient litigation practices.36
Registration results in proof of ownership.37
Therefore, copyright registration narrows the issues

§ 411(a) by “striking ‘actions for infringement of copyright in Berne Convention works whose
country of origin is not the United States[’]” and “inserting ‘United States’ after ‘no action for
infringement of the copyright in any’’).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2011) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any
United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim
has been made . . . .”) (emphasis added).
32. See supra Part II.B. Note that registration for all works is still required within three
months of first publication to qualify for statutory damages or attorney’s fees in any copyright
infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2011). This requirement is beyond the scope of this
article.
33. See supra Part II.B.2-3.
34. See supra Part II.B.2-3.
35. See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 36 (1988) (proposing replacing § 411(a) with
“Registration is not a prerequisite to the institution of a civil action for infringement of
copyright.”).
36. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 41 (1988).
37. See id.
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that must be litigated in resolving the underlying
dispute, to the benefit of the courts, the public, and the
parties.38
Registration may deter frivolous law suits. The House
Committee was also concerned that, in the absence of
§ 411(a), the courtroom doors would be wide open to
parties without a legitimate copyright claim.39
“[P]laintiffs can exploit discovery and other
procedures . . . to extract settlements and cause
financial harm to legitimate competition and
ultimately the public through higher prices.”40
Therefore, § 411(a) to some extent may deter
unwarranted infringement claims.
Registration helps to ensure a central, public record of
copyright claims.41 Public access to this information
promotes licensing markets by bringing copyright
owners and licensees together. In turn, this serves to
encourage further creativity by rewarding authors with
incremental revenue that would otherwise not be
possible.
Finally, registration is an important source of
acquisitions for the Library of Congress.42

2. Definition of “United States Work”
In the case of published works, a work is deemed a “United
States work” when any one of the following conditions occurs:
(1) The work is first published in the United States.
(2) The work is simultaneously published in the United
States and another treaty party nation.
(3) The work is simultaneously published in the United
States and a foreign nation that is not a treaty party.
(4) The work is first published in a foreign nation that is not
a treaty party, and all of the authors are nationals of the

38. See id.
39. See id. at 42.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2011) (specifying procedure of depositing of copies or
phonorecords for the Library of Congress).
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United States.43
Section 101 is silent as to the meaning of simultaneous
publication. However, the drafters of § 104A adopted a 30-day
window during which all publications are considered simultaneous.
Section 104A defines “[t]he term ‘restored work’ [as] an original
work of authorship that . . . if published, was first published in an
eligible country and not published in the United States during the 30day period following publication in such eligible country.”44 In other
words, if a work was first published in an eligible country and was
simultaneously published in the United States—within 30 days of first
publication—the work is not a foreign work eligible for restoration.
This is consistent with the definition of simultaneous publication in
both the Berne Convention45 and the Universal Copyright Convention
(UCC).46 As such, one reasonable approach is to apply the 30-day rule
to the definition of a “United States work.” Under this definition, a
work is simultaneously published in the United States and another
treaty party when the time between first publication in the treaty party
and subsequent publication in the United States is less than or equal to
30 days.
3. Exclusive Right of Distribution
Section 106(3) grants the copyright owner the exclusive right to
“distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending.”47 This right is limited to the first public distribution of an
authorized copy or phonorecord.48 Any unauthorized public
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011). “A ‘treaty party’ is a country or intergovernmental
organization other than the United States that is a party to an international agreement.” Id. The
term “international agreement” includes the Berne Convention, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Id.
44. Id. § 104A(h)(6)(D).
45. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 3(4) (“A work shall be considered as having
been published simultaneously in several countries if it has been published in two or more
countries within thirty days of its first publication.”) (emphasis added).
46. The Universal Copyright Convention, art. 4(6), Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216
U.N.T.S. 134, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1349, 943 U.N.T.S. 178
(“[A]ny work published in two or more . . . States within thirty days of its first publication shall
be considered as having been published simultaneously in said . . . States.”) (emphasis added).
The United States has been a member of the UCC since September 16, 1955. See International
Copyright, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl100.html (last visited Apr.
10, 2013).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2011).
48. See id. § 109(a) (2011) (first sale doctrine); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976) (“As
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distribution of copies or phonorecords that were unlawfully made
could constitute infringement.49
4. Definition of “Publication”
Publication is affected by distribution. The Copyright Act
defines publication in terms of both actual distributions and offers to
distribute:
Publication is [1] the [actual] distribution of copies or
phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. [2] The offering to
distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for
purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public
display, constitutes publication. [3] A public performance or
display of a work does not of itself constitute publication.50

Actual distribution occurs when one or more copies or
phonorecords are distributed to the public.51 Central to the definition
of actual distribution is that there must be a transfer of possession—
by sale, rental, lease, lending, or other transfer—of a material object52
from the copyright holder to the public.53 The reader should note that
an actual transfer of ownership is sufficient but not necessary for
publication by actual distribution.
Alternatively, certain offers-to-distribute the material object for
further distribution constitute publication.54 Unlike publication by
actual distribution, publication by an offer to distribute does not
require a transfer of possession of a material object.55 Because of the

section 109 makes clear, however, the copyright owner’s rights under section 106(3) cease with
respect to a particular copy or phonorecord once he has parted with ownership of it.”).
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 501.
50. Id. § 101 (emphasis added).
51. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 138. The “public” means persons under no express or
implied restrictions with respect to disclosure of the work.” Id.
52. “Copies” and “phonorecords” are defined as material objects in which a work is
fixed, such as a book, periodical, manuscript, phonorecord, film, tape, or disks. See § 101.
53. See id.
54. See Id. (definition of publication).
55. See Id. The plain language makes clear that Congress did not intend for publication
by an offer to distribute to require actual transfer of a possessory interest in the material object.
Had Congress intended such a requirement, the drafters could easily have included the language
“to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending” found in the
preceding sentence but chose not to. The majority of courts agree. See Capitol Records Inc. v.
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1223 (D. Minn. 2008) (“The general rule, supported by the great
weight of authority, is that ‘infringement of [the distribution right] requires an actual
dissemination of either copies or phonorecords.” (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Car
Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993)) (internal
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clear distinction between actual distributions and offers to distribute
in the definition of “publication,” the exclusive right of distribution
appears to be limited to actual distribution.56 In other words, there
must be an unauthorized transfer of possession of a material object for
there to be infringement.57
B. Internet Publication
1. How Material Objects Change Hands on the Internet
As noted above, actual distribution requires, at a minimum, a
transfer of possession of a material object.58 Books and music CDs
are very common examples of material objects—a physical object in
which a copy of the original work is fixed. But what constitutes a
material object on the Internet? At what point does a possessory
interest in such an object change hands from copyright owner to the
public?
In the electronic world, electronic data files—encoded magnetic
particles on a portion of the physical hard disk—constitute material
objects of the works they embody.59 The Internet is a communications
network that connects users to a myriad of linked works including
documents, images, music, and video content available on the Web.60
quotation marks omitted)); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 169 (D.
Mass. 2008) (“If [the author] merely offers to sell [the copyrighted work] to . . . [a] member of
the public, that is neither a distribution nor a publication. And if the author offers to sell the
manuscript to a publishing house ‘for purposes of further distribution,’ but does not actually do
so, that is a publication but not a distribution.”).
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). Congress reapplied the exact language of publication by
actual distribution—to “distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”—when defining the
exclusive right of distribution. Id.
57. Note that a minority of courts disagree, holding that merely making a work available
for unauthorized copying constitutes an offer to distribute in violation of the right of
distribution. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 65765, at *10 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (“[L]isting copyrighted works on an online file-sharing
system contemplates ‘further distribution,’ and thus, could constitute a violation of the copyright
owner’s exclusive distribution right under § 106(3).”).
58. See supra text accompanying note 53.
59. London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 171 (“The electronic file (or, perhaps
more accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard disk) is therefore a ‘phonorecord’ within
the meaning of the statute.”).
60. Definition of Internet, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/internet (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (defining Internet as “an electronic
communications network that connects computer networks and organizational computer
facilities around the world”); Definition of World Wide Web, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/world+wide+web?show=0&t=1335114819
(last
visited Apr. 10, 2013) (defining World Wide Web as “a part of the Internet accessed through a
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Prior to any transfer of ownership or possession, each of these objects
resides as an electronic data file stored on a hard disk.
In London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, the court held that the
term “material object” indeed includes electronic copies. This court
reasoned that the term “material” “should not be understood as
separating tangible copies from non-tangible copies. Rather, it
separates a copy from the abstract original work . . . .”61 For example,
sounds—the abstract original work—are separate from the
phonorecord—the copy or material object—in which they are fixed.62
Further, Congress defined material object as a tangible medium of
expression in which an abstract original work is fixed.63 The only
express limitation on this medium of expression is that it be
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit [the work] to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.”64 Clearly, electronic files satisfy this limitation.
Therefore, the copyright owner’s rights extend beyond tangible,
physical objects to include purely electronic distributions of their
work.65 Based on this reasoning, the court held that “an electronic file
transfer can constitute a ‘transfer of ownership’ as that term is used in
§ 106(3).”66
Transfer of ownership or possession on the Internet occurs when
a data file is downloaded from a web server to a local computer. Once
the file transfer is complete, a copy of the data file resides on a hard
disk in the possession of the person who requested the file.67 For
example, music is commonly distributed on the Internet in the format
of MP3 files.68 Once an MP3 file is posted to the Internet (by copying
the file onto the hard disk of the server on which the data for the
website resides), the file can be downloaded directly to a local
computer.69 Upon completion of the download, the person receiving
the MP3 file now has possession of the sound recording embodied in
a material object (the person’s hard disk) and the ability to play the

graphical
Web”).
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

user interface and containing documents often connected by hyperlinks—called also
London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
See id.
Id.
See London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
Id.
See PRESTON GRALLA, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS 147 (8th ed. 2007).
See id. at 252.
See id. at 253.
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music, make copies and further distribute the file.70
2. What Constitutes Distribution and Publication on the
Internet?
From the earliest days of the Internet in 1993 to 2008 it is
understandable that the courts were operating in a reactionary mode to
the rapid onset of Internet technology. Therefore, it is not surprising
to observe four distinct attempts at defining distribution on the
Internet during this period. Specifically, copyright infringement
occurred on the Internet when:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Distribution occurred where copies were made
available for download.71
Distribution occurred where copies were sold to the
public.72
Publication occurred where copies were made
available causing a transfer of the possessory interest.73
Publication—in violation of the distribution right—
occurred where copies were offered for further
distribution.74

More recent decisions have adhered more closely to the statutory
requirement. They held that publication requires an actual transfer of
ownership or transfer in a possessory interest.
a. Early Decisions: Distribution Occurred When
Copies Were Made Available for Download
Only two years after the launch of the Web,75 in 1993, the
Middle District of Florida decided Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Frena.76 In Frena, the defendant operated an electronic “bulletin
70. See id.
71. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d,
284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d.
628, 632 (D. Md. 2006); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 513
(N.D. Ohio 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
72. See N.Y. Times, Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 499 (2001).
73. See Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
74. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, No. H-06-3578, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53654, at *20 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
75. See GRALLA, supra note 67, at 11 (dating the development of the World Wide Web to
1991).
76. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552.
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board”77 on which paid subscribers were permitted to share and
download files.78 Playboy sued Frena for copyright infringement after
discovering 170 of its images were displayed and available for
unauthorized download on the bulletin board.79 In finding an
unauthorized distribution to the public, the court focused on the fact
that Frena “supplied a [website] containing unauthorized copies of a
copyrighted work.”80 The court disregarded the fact that Frena himself
did not post the infringing images and it did not require evidence of
actual downloading.81 This case stands for the proposition that
making a file-sharing platform available on the Internet is sufficient to
find liability for any infringing files posted to it by its visitors.
While this holding appears far-reaching, the record shows that
Frena’s subscribers not only browsed Playboy’s images but also
downloaded them.82 More recent jurisprudence would likely have
reached a similar conclusion but for different reasons. The act of
downloading the infringing images constituted a “transfer of
ownership” of the data representing the copyrighted work. As such,
the transaction should have been deemed an unauthorized publication
in violation of Playboy’s exclusive right to distribute these images.
As the Internet spawned a new breed of high-tech infringers,
Playboy continued to vigorously assert its intellectual property rights.
In 1996, Playboy sued Chuckleberry Publishing for operating an
Italian based website called PLAYMEN in violation of an
injunction.83 The purpose of the injunction was to prohibit the
defendant from distributing its product in the United States.84 The
case turned on whether the defendant “distributed or sold the
PLAYMEN magazine in the United States when it established an
Internet site” in Italy displaying pictorial images under the
77. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 505 (N.D.
Ohio 1997) (“A computer bulletin board service . . . offers home computer owners a method for
obtaining information from a central source . . . .” ). In contrast, a peer-to-peer file sharing
network offers a method for obtaining information from distributed computers throughout the
peer network. See GRALLA supra note 67, at 392.
78. Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1554.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1556.
81. Id. at 1554 (the images were posted by subscribers to the bulletin board).
82. Id.
83. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aff’d, 687 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1982) (enjoining Chuckleberry Publishing from using the
PLAYMEN mark in connection with a male sophisticate magazine in the United States on the
basis of trademark infringement).
84. See Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. at 1037.
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PLAYMEN name.85 In Chuckleberry, the court built upon the Frena
decision, finding a distribution where defendant: (1) provided an
Internet platform that (2) supplied content which (3) could be
downloaded and stored upon subscribers’ computers.86
Chuckleberry added a new dimension to the discussion, by
asking whether such activity performed on a foreign Internet site
constituted a distribution in the United States. The court looked to
evidence that the defendant maintained online accounts with U.S.
customers.87 Based on these facts, the court held that the “[d]efendant
actively solicited United States customers . . . , and in doing so ha[d]
distributed its product within the United States.”88
The Chuckleberry holding is broader than Frena because there
was no evidence of actual downloading. Chuckleberry therefore
stands for the rule that merely making a work available for download
on the Internet constitutes distribution.89
In the ongoing battle to protect its business model, Playboy
returned to the courthouse again in 1997. This time, Playboy brought
suit against Russ Hardenburgh, Inc. for operating a bulletin board
service on which Hardenburgh made available 412 of Playboy’s
images for unauthorized download.90 Like Frena, Hardenburgh
supplied a file-sharing platform from which unauthorized images
could be downloaded. However, taking it one step further,
Hardenburgh actively encouraged subscribers to upload adult
photographs.91 Consistent with Frena, the Hardenburgh court held
that a distribution occurred when unauthorized images were made
available for download on a website.
In 2001, the Ninth Circuit famously brought an end to Napster’s
Internet-based music file-sharing system.92 Unlike the centralized

85. Id. at 1036.
86. See id. at 1039.
87. See id. (the defendant sent U.S. subscribers an email with user name and password).
88. Id.
89. See Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing
Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. at 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (uploading content on internet
and inviting users to download it violates exclusive publication right)).
90. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 505 (N.D. Ohio
1997).
91. See id. at 506 (“Subscribers were given a ‘credit’ for each megabyte of electronic data
that they uploaded onto the system. For each credit, the subscriber was entitled to download 1.5
extra megabytes of electronic information, in addition to the megabytes available under the
normal terms of subscription.”).
92. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 284 F.3d
1091 (9th Cir. 2002); see also John Borland, Roxio Closes Napster Asset Buy, CNET NEWS
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“bulletin board” file-sharing systems in the Playboy cases, Napster’s
file sharing occurred across a distributed peer-to-peer network.93 In
this scheme, each user volunteered their own computer to serve as one
node in a vast network of Napster users.94 To connect this network,
Napster provided software to its members.95 The software enabled its
users to make their own MP3 files available for download to any
other Napster user in the network.96 In exchange, the software allowed
each user to search the network and download MP3s directly from the
hard drives of other Napster users.
Despite the differences between centralized and distributed peerto-peer file sharing, the basis for finding infringement was the same.
In Napster, the court held that “Napster users who upload file names
to the search index for others to copy violate . . . [the record
company’s] distribution rights.”97 As in the file-sharing cases before
it, the Napster court suggested that merely making files available for
download—as opposed to requiring actual downloads—constituted a
violation of the record company’s distribution right.
In 2001, Advanced Magazine Publishers (AMP) brought an
infringement action against David Leach for making unauthorized
electronic copies of book-length stories available for download on the
Internet.98 Leach (1) scanned the literary works into electronic form,
(2) integrated the works with paid advertising, and (3) made the
works available for download on the Internet.99 In its analysis, the
court found that the defendant’s online database of literary works was
similar to the Nexis online database in New York Times v. Tasini.100
Consistent with Justice Ginsburg’s dicta in Tasini,101 the court held
that “[d]efendant operates . . . an online database of literary works,
and by making available unauthorized copies of Plaintiff’s
publications, he . . . infringed [plaintiff’s] right to distribution.”102 In
other words, the court concluded that creation of a capability to
(Nov. 27, 2002, 4:30 PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-975627.html (discussing the demise
of Napster).
93. See Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1012 (9th Cir. 2001).
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1011.
96. See id. at 1011-12.
97. Id. at 1014.
98. See Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d. 628, 632 (D. Md.
2006).
99. See id.
100. See N.Y. Times, Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
101. See infra note 108.
102. Advance Magazine Publishers Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d. at 638.
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transfer possession of copies of the articles, rather than the actual
transfer, was an unauthorized distribution.
b. Early Decisions: Distribution Occurred When
Copies Were Sold to the Public
In 2001, the Supreme Court weighed in on the discussion in New
York Times v. Tasini.103 In Tasini, freelance writers sued Lexis Nexis
for the unauthorized placement of their articles in the Nexis
Database.104 In finding infringement, the court held that “by selling
copies of the Articles through the NEXIS Database, [Lexis Nexis]
‘distribute[d] copies’ of the Articles ‘to the public by sale’” in
violation of the author’s exclusive distribution right.105
Although in dicta, Justice Ginsburg commented that “[t]he
crucial fact is that the [D]atabase[] . . . store[s] and retrieve[s] articles
separately within a vast domain of diverse texts. Such a storage and
retrieval system effectively overrides the Authors’ exclusive right to
control the individual . . . distribution of each Article . . . .”106 It is
striking how readily Ginsburg’s description of the Nexis database
applies to the Internet. For example, Google enables users to search
for, locate and retrieve articles—and much more—from a “vast
domain of diverse texts” that span the Web. Further, just as Lexis
users “may view, print, or download each of the articles yielded by
the search,”107 the same is true for Google users. Although,
infringement in Tasini was triggered by actual sales to the public,
Ginsburg’s commentary has been cited for the broad proposition that
merely making a work available on the Internet—where it is possible
to retrieve and download the work—constitutes a distribution of that
work.108 It is not clear from the opinion, however, whether the Court
would require evidence of actual downloads. Ginsburg’s use of the
term “retrieval” might suggest something more is required than
merely making a work available.

103. N.Y. Times Co., 533 U.S. 483.
104. See id. at 487.
105. Id. at 498.
106. Id. at 503-04.
107. Id. at 490.
108. See Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d. at 637-38 (citing N.Y. Times
Co., 533 U.S. at 488) (“[T]he Supreme Court held that two online database companies violated
six freelance authors’ rights of distribution by making copies of their articles available to the
databases’ users without the authors’ consent.”).
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c. Early Decisions: Publication Occurred When
Copies Were Made Available
In 2002, the Southern District of New York addressed, for the
first time, the publication of an entire webpage rather than a single
music or image file embedded in one.109 In Getaped.com, Inc. v.
Cangemi, the plaintiff developed the website Getaped.com to sell
motorized scooters. Defendants copied the Getaped website and
“post[ed] identical source code at their own sites.”110 Getaped sued
claiming that replication of their website infringed its copyright.111
The court granted Getaped statutory damages, holding that
“when a webpage goes live on the Internet, it is distributed and
‘published’ in the same way the music files in Napster or the
photographs in the various Playboy decisions were distributed and
‘published.’”112 In support, the court stated that “by accessing a
webpage, an Internet user acquires the ability to make a copy of that
webpage, a copy that is, in fact, indistinguishable in every part from
the original.”113 Therefore, “[w]hen a website goes live, the creator
loses the ability to control either duplication or further distribution of
his or her work.”114 In reaching its conclusion, the court equated
making files available on the Internet with loss of control of the
possessory interest in tangible copies.115 The court held that this loss
of control satisfied the transfer of ownership element of
publication.116
d. Publication—In Violation of the Distribution
Right—Occurred When Copies Were Offered for
Further Distribution
In 2008, seven years after Napster, another peer-to-peer music
file-sharing case, Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Anderson, was
adjudicated.117 This time, however, instead of suing KaZaA, the
network provider, Atlantic Recording Corporation sued an individual

109. Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
110. Id. at 399-400.
111. See id. at 400.
112. Id. at 402.
113. Id.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. See id. at 401.
116. See id. at 402.
117. Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, No. H-06-3578, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53654
(S.D. Tex. 2008).
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user of the KaZaA network, Abner Anderson.118 Anderson admitted
to “using the KaZaA online media distribution system to both
download and make available, without Plaintiffs’ authorization or
consent, certain Copyrighted Recordings.”119 In finding infringement,
the court held that the terms “distribution” and “publication” were
synonymous.120
“Publication” includes “[t]he offering to distribute copies or
phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further
distribution . . . [and] making copyrighted works available for
download via a peer-to-peer network contemplates “further
distribution . . . .” and thus constitutes a violation of the copyright
owner’s exclusive “distribution” right . . . .121

Consistent with prior decisions, this court overlooked the § 106(3)
requirement of transfer of ownership or in a possessory interest in
reaching its conclusion. Although an offer to distribute may constitute
a publication under § 101, it does not qualify as a distribution in
violation of § 106(3).122 There must be at least a transfer of possession
in the music file.123
e. The Modern Trend: Violation of the Distribution
Right on the Internet Requires Actual Distribution
There are many parallels between London-Sire Records124 and
Anderson.125 Both actions involved record companies suing individual
users of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks.126 In each case, the issue
was whether the users transferred a possessory interest in a sound
recording—thereby affecting an unauthorized distribution.127 The
decisions even came down in the same month, March 2008.
Nonetheless, the London-Sire Records decision marked a significant
shift in how courts view distributions on the Internet.128 Following
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id. at *6.
120. See id. at *18 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
552 (1985))
121. Id. at *18-19.
122. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(3) (2011).
123. See supra text accompanying note 53.
124. See supra Part III.B.1.
125. See supra Part III.B.2.d.
126. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 157 (D. Mass. 2008);
Atl. Recording Corp., No. H-06-3578, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53654 at *4.
127. See London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 166; Atl. Recording Corp., No. H06-3578, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53654 at *18.
128. See London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 153 (holding that (1) material
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this case, the modern trend is to require more than making a work
available for download; instead there must be an actual transfer of
ownership to find a violation of the distribution right.129 This shift
warrants a closer look at the approach taken by the court in LondonSire Records.
The alleged acts of infringement are now familiar. London-Sire
sued individual users of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks who
allegedly downloaded and distributed plaintiff’s sound recordings to
the public.130 The defendants argued that to find infringement there
must be “actual dissemination of copyrighted material.”131
In deciding whether the statute required an actual distribution,
the court turned to the statutory definition of “Publication”132:
“Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or
phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further
distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes
publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of
itself constitute publication.133

Looking to the first sentence, the court concluded that all distributions
to the public are publications for purposes of Copyright.134 Separately,
the second sentence explicitly creates an additional category of
publications that are not distributions.135 “Plainly, ‘publication’ and
‘distribution’ are not identical.”136 The court reasoned that not all

objects include copies fixed in electronic form, and (2) distribution on the Internet requires
actual transfer of ownership of a material object).
129. See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008); LondonSire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 153; Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976
(D. Ariz. 2008).
130. See London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 159. However, unlike Anderson,
the defendants here were known only by their computers’ IP addresses. See id. at 158-59.
London-Sire served subpoenas on their internet service providers to establish defendants’
identities. See id. at 159. The court’s opinion was written in response to defendants’ motion to
quash the subpoenas. See id. at 153. On a motion to quash, the court must consider—among
other factors—whether the plaintiff asserted a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id. at
164.
131. Id. at 165.
132. See id. at 169 (“[D]efendants cannot be liable for violating the plaintiffs’ distribution
right unless a ‘distribution’ actually occurred.”).
133. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
134. See London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 169.
135. See id.
136. Id.
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publications involve distributions to the public.137 Thus, “Congress’
decision to use the . . . term [‘distribution’] when defining the
copyright holder’s rights . . . must be given consequence.”138
Therefore, in this context—where the alleged infringement is a
distribution to the public—the court held that “defendants cannot be
liable for violating the plaintiffs’ distribution right unless a
‘distribution’ actually occurred.”139
One month later, the court in Atlantic Recording Corp. v.
Howell140 followed the holding in London-Sire Records. Howell was
yet another peer-to-peer file sharing case. Following the analysis in
London-Sire Records, the court reaffirmed that “a publication can be
either a distribution or an offer to distribute for the purposes of further
distribution, but that a distribution [to the public] must involve . . .
[some] transfer of ownership . . . of a copy of the work.”141 Relying on
earlier holdings, Atlantic Recording argued that Howell violated its
distribution right in the sound recordings by making them available
for the public to copy.142 Following London-Sire Records, the court
rejected plaintiff’s argument. The court held that unless a “copy of the
work change[d] hands . . . a ‘distribution’ under § 106(3) has not
taken place.”143
In September of 2008, the issue of what constitutes an electronic
transfer of ownership arose in Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas,144 in
which a jury found defendant Jammie Thomas guilty of infringement
for “illegally downloading and distributing [Capitol Records’]
recordings via the online peer-to-peer file sharing application known
as Kazaa.”145 When Thomas moved for a new trial, the district court
sua sponte challenged the jury instructions.146 Jury Instruction No. 15
read:
The act of making copyrighted sound recordings available for
electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license

137. See id.
138. Id. at 169. See also 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (the exclusive right to “distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending”).
139. London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 169.
140. Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008).
141. Id. at 985 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. See id. at 981.
143. Id. at 983
144. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
145. See id. at 1212-13.
146. See id. at 1212.
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from the copyright owners, violates the copyright owners’
exclusive right of distribution, regardless of whether actual
distribution has been shown.147

In its error analysis, the court diligently retraced the steps first taken
in London-Sire Records.148 After reviewing the plain meaning of
§ 106(3), and consulting a dictionary149 and Professor Nimmer,150 the
court reiterated the reasoning found in London-Sire Records:
“Liability for violation of the exclusive distribution right found in
§ 106(3) requires actual dissemination.”151 As such, the court found
Jury Instruction No. 15 to be erroneous and granted Thomas a new
trial.152 Thus, Capitol Records reinforces the modern interpretation
that unauthorized distribution requires transfer of ownership or
possession of a material object.
In summary, cases pertaining to Internet publication and
distribution have begun to coalesce as to the meaning of these terms.
Although an offer to distribute may constitute a publication under
§ 101, it does not qualify as a distribution in violation of § 106(3).153
Distribution requires transfer of possession.154
3. Does Internet Publication Constitute Global
Simultaneous Publication
In October of 2009, Moberg v. 33T, LLC raised an issue of first
impression with regard to foreign copyrighted works posted on the
Internet155—whether publishing on the Internet constitutes global and
simultaneous publication.
147. Id. at 1213 (emphasis added).
148. See id. at 1217-25.
149. See id. at 1217 (defining “‘distribute’ as, among other things, ‘1: to divide among
several or many: APPORTION . . . 2 . . . b: to give out or deliver esp. to members of a group’”
(quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 337 (10th ed. 1999))).
150. See id. at 1223 (“As Professor Nimmer has stated, ‘[i]infringement of [the distribution
right] requires an actual dissemination of either copies or phonorecords.’ 2 Nimmer on
Copyright 8.11[A], at 8-124.1.” (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v.
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993))).
151. Id. at 1226.
152. Id. at 1226-27.
153. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(3) (2011). See also Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F.
Supp. 2d 1210, 1218 (D. Minn. 2008) (stating that distribution on the Internet requires actual
transfer of ownership); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz.
2008) (same); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 174 (D. Mass. 2008)
(same).
154. See § 106(3). See also London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 174 (stating that
distribution on the Internet requires actual transfer of ownership).
155. Moberg v. 33T LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D. Del. 2009).
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In 2004, Plaintiff Håkan Moberg, Swedish resident and
photographer, published a series of photographs on a German art
website called blaugallery.com.156 In 2007, Moberg discovered 5 of
his images had been posted on defendant 33T’s websites.157 Without
first registering the photographs with the U.S. Copyright Office,
Moberg filed his complaint alleging infringement based on 33T’s
unauthorized distribution of his photographs on defendant’s
websites.158
33T moved to dismiss, arguing that because plaintiff’s
photographs were posted on a website, and visible instantaneously all
over the world, they were published not only in Germany, but also
simultaneously in the United States.159 Therefore, 33T contended, the
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s copyright
claims because a “United States work” must be registered prior to the
filing of a civil action for copyright infringement.160
The court rejected 33T’s assertion, holding that Moberg’s
photographs were not published simultaneously in the United States
and Germany.161 As a matter of policy, the court opined:
To hold otherwise would require an artist to survey all the
copyright laws throughout the world, determine what requirements
exist as preconditions to suits in those countries should one of its
citizens infringe on the artist’s rights, and comply with those
formalities, all prior to posting any copyrighted image on the
Internet. The Berne Convention was formed, in part, to prevent
exactly this result.162

Therefore, the court held that plaintiff’s photographs were not
“United States works,” and Moberg’s copyright infringement claims
could stand without satisfying U.S. registration requirements.163 The
Moberg court did not ignore the technical reality of simultaneous
publication; instead it rejected its legal implication—that
simultaneous publication qualifies works of foreign origin as United
States works. Contrary to the plain language of the statute, the court
reached this result in an attempt to comply with the absence of
156. See id. at 417-18. The series of photographs was of a woman and titled Urban
Gregorian I-IX. See id.
157. See id. at 418.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 422.
160. See id. at 419; see also 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
161. Id. at 424.
162. Id. at 422-23.
163. See id. at 424.
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formalities principle of the Berne Convention.
In 2011, a similar fact pattern emerged in Kernal Records Oy v.
Mosley.164 In Kernal, the plaintiff record company alleged that
Mosley made an unauthorized copy of the plaintiff’s sound recording
of the song Acidjazzed Evening (AJE).165 The court addressed two
issues: first, whether AJE had been published on the Internet in
Australia, and second, whether AJE was simultaneously published in
Australia and the United States, rendering it a United States work.166
First, the court held that AJE was published on the Internet in
Australia.167 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court applied
the pre-2008 “making available” standard.168 “AJE was not merely
transmitted over the Internet; it was downloadable and copyable
which allowed the public to acquire a possessory interest in tangible
copies of the work.”169 Applying the recent London-Sire Records,170
Anderson,171 and Capitol Records172 approach the posting of AJE to
the Internet would not qualify as a distribution. There must be actual
downloading to show a transfer of ownership or of the possessory
interest and thereby satisfy the statutory requirements for a
distribution.173
Second, having found AJE first published on the Internet in
Australia, the court next considered whether the publication occurred
simultaneously in the United States. There being no statutory
definition of “simultaneous,” the court reached for a dictionary and
confirmed the common meaning of “simultaneous” as “existing or
occurring at the same time: exactly coincident.”174 The court opined
“[t]here can be little dispute that posting material on the Internet

164. Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d, 694 F.3d
1294 (11th Cir. 2012).
165. Id. at 1358.
166. See id. at 1360.
167. See id. at 1364.
168. See id.
169. Id. n.7. There is some doubt as to whether AJE had been posted to the Internet.
Defendant’s testimony appears to indicate publication occurred on a disk magazine, rather than
the Internet. Nevertheless, the court concludes that “the first publication of AJE was posted on
an online magazine”. See id. at 1361.
170. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008).
171. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, No. H-06-3578, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53654
(S.D. Tex. 2008).
172. See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
173. See London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 169.
174. Definition of Simultaneous, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/simultaneous (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
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makes it available at the same time—simultaneously—to anyone with
access to the Internet.”175 Further, the court found no suggestion by
Congress to exclude works published on the Internet from the
definitions of “United States work” or “publication.”176 Based on the
plain meaning of “United States work” and having already found AJE
first published on the Internet in Australia, the court held that AJE
simultaneously published in the United States.177 Therefore AJE was a
“United States work” subject to the registration requirement.178
Because Kernal had not registered its copyright before filing suit,
the court granted summary judgment for defendants on the
registration issue.179 Immediately thereafter, plaintiff obtained
registration and moved to amend the complaint.180 Kernal Records
argued that amendment was appropriate because it had relied on the
position that AJE was not a “United States work” and therefore not
subject to the registration requirement.181 However, the court denied
Kernal Records’ motion for failure to show good cause for an
untimely amendment.182 Kernal Records has filed an appeal with the
Eleventh Circuit which affirmed the decision of the lower court.183
IV. COMPLIANCE WITH BERNE CONVENTION
A. U.S. Copyright Law Violates the Berne Convention
The current definition of “United States works” in § 101 of the
Copyright Act is overly broad. In particular, the use of the term
“simultaneously” has proven to be problematic in the Internet age.
Foreign works, when published on the Internet, are simultaneously
published in the United States and world-wide.184 As a result of
simultaneous publication in the United States, the foreign work is a
“United States work” in accordance with the current definition:

175. Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d,
694 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012).
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1368.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 1369.
182. See id. at 1369-70 (“Plaintiff is attempting to amend the complaint to allege copyright
registration when registration was not even sought until after summary judgment was granted
for Defendants on the issue.”).
183. Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012).
184. See id. at 1368.
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a work is a “United States work” only if—
(1) in the case of a published work, the work is first published—
...
(B) simultaneously in the United States and another treaty party
or parties, whose law grants a term of copyright protection that is
the same as or longer than the term provided in the United States;
[or]
(C) simultaneously in the United States and a foreign nation that
is not a treaty party . . . .185

As a “United States work,” any work published by posting on the
Internet is now subject to the registration requirement of § 411(a) and
the copyright holder must register the work with the U.S. Copyright
Office prior to filing a civil action in copyright infringement.186 As
discussed above, the U.S. registration requirement of § 411(a) is an
impermissible formality that violates the Berne Convention when
applied to foreign works.187
Congress never intended this result. U.S. copyright law was
drafted before the emergence of today’s Internet. This is apparent
from the 1988 BCIA hearings in which stated: “Indeed, countless
authors, composers and artists—as well as small publishers—cannot
with their limited means afford even to attempt ‘simultaneous
publication’ of their works outside the United States.”188 Although the
change from excluding “Berne Convention works” from registration
to requiring registration only for “United States works” occurred as
recently as October 28, 1998,189 this was still near the very beginning
of the Internet explosion.190 For perspective, Napster would not be in
existence for another nine months at the time Congress adopted the
amendment.191 The ease with which works are now published,
downloaded, copied, and distributed would have been unimaginable

185. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
186. See § 411(a).
187. See supra text accompanying note 15.
188. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, 100th Cong. 279 (1988).
189. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (specifying effective date of 1998 amendments as Oct. 28,
1998).
190. Modern commercial use of the Internet did not manifest itself until the early 1990s.
For example, Internet banking did not emerge until 1994 with the launch of First Virtual. In that
same year, the first commercial banner ads appeared on www.hotwired.com. See Robert H.
Zakon,
Hobbes’
Internet
Timeline
10.2,
ZAKON.ORG,
http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ (last updated Dec. 30, 2011).
191. See GRALLA, supra note 67, at 11.
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to the drafters of the current Copyright Act.
The following examples illustrate: (1) how likely events similar
to those in Moberg and Kernal Records are to recur, especially in
light of the continued development of the Internet, and (2) the
existence of a vast class of local copyright holders who, when
publishing their work on the Internet, have no intention to publish in
the United States nor would they benefit from such publishing.
Imagine Sarah, a young woman with a passion for photography
and an entrepreneurial spirit. Growing up in a small town in New
Zealand, she decides to leverage her local connections and starts up a
family photography business. Like many photographers today, she
launches a website on which she posts pictures for her clients to select
from and purchase. The site also serves as a marketing tool to
promote her trade within the local community. As a family portrait
photographer, the scope of her client base is limited to a geographical
area in which she can reasonably commute to and from.
In this example, it is clear that when Sarah publishes a series of
family photos on her site, she is targeting that specific family and
perhaps other locals who might now be inspired to schedule a photo
shoot. However, under Kernal Records, her photographs are “United
States works” and although Sarah doesn’t know it, the formality of
the U.S. registration requirement now applies to her. If she needs to
enforce her copyrights in the United States, she must first register
under § 411(a).
Building on the same example, Sarah begins posting and selling
photographs depicting the natural scenery of New Zealand. A year
later, she discovers that her images are on sale in the United States at
a Wal-Mart store without her authorization. Once again, Sarah’s
foreign works are deemed United States works and subject to the
formality of registration in violation of Berne Convention. Although it
is difficult to project the number of individual foreign copyright
holders publishing their works on the Internet, it is reasonable to
conclude that vast numbers of foreign works are presently subject to
the formality of the U.S. registration requirement in violation of the
Convention.
The recent holding in Kernal Records shows the potential for
harm.192 In addition to imposing the registration requirement—a
formality in violation of Berne Convention—the court in Kernal
Records granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment of
192. Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d, 694 F.3d
1294 (11th Cir. 2012).
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copyright infringement because plaintiff failed to register the
copyright prior to filing the complaint.193 Kernal Records
subsequently registered its copyright and filed an appeal.194 Congress
never intended for parties like Kernal Records—who hold rights in a
foreign work—to deal with the cost of litigating and losing a motion
for summary judgment for failure to comply with a formality in
violation of the Berne Convention.195 As the Article will demonstrate,
the amendments need not be drastic to eliminate this issue.
B. Possible Solutions
1. Eliminate the § 411(a) Registration Requirement
The elimination of § 411(a) certainly would eliminate the
formality of the registration requirement and therefore would restore
compliance with the Berne Convention. However, this is an overly
drastic approach. As discussed above,196 Congress considered this
very measure when drafting the BCIA but decided in favor of
maintaining the requirement due to the following public benefits: (1)
registration promotes efficient litigation practices, (2) registration
may deter frivolous law suits, (3) registration helps to ensure a
central, public record of copyright claims, and (4) registration is a
source of acquisitions for the Library of Congress.
2. Change the Definition of “Publication”
A change to the definition of “Publication” must be made with
extreme caution. There are well over 100 instances of the term
“publication” scattered throughout the Copyright Act. As a result any
solution implemented to restore compliance with Berne Convention is
likely to trigger new and unexpected consequences. By contrast, the
term “United States work” appears only once in the Act, and therefore
it is less likely that an amendment here will cause unexpected
consequences.
3. Change the Definition of “United States Work”
This Article recommends limiting the scope of “United States
works” to include only those simultaneous Internet publications in
which the copyright holder actively solicited customers in the United

193.
194.
195.
196.

See id. at 1368.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 32.
See supra Part III.A.1.
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States. This proposal recognizes two classes affected by the
simultaneous publication problem: (1) those who publish on the
Internet with intent to actively solicit customers in the United States,
and (2) those who publish on the Internet for any other purpose.
“Active solicitors” who deliberately target their online resources
at the United States for their commercial benefit essentially have
elected to operate within the United States economy. As such, it is
appropriate for the works in this category to be treated as “United
States works” subject to the same formalities as those residing in the
United States who publish on the Internet for the purpose of actively
soliciting U.S. customers.
In principle, this approach is consistent with the intent of the
Convention’s “country of origin” framework. Article 5(4) was drafted
so that the country of origin would coincide with the “locus of
economic centre of the exploitation of their work.”197 If that rationale
is applied in the Internet age, it is entirely consistent to assign the
United States as the country of origin for those who simultaneously
publish their works on the Internet for the purpose of “actively
soliciting” customers in the United States, the U.S. being the
economic center for the exploitation of their work. Therefore, if the
United States is the country of origin for works that target U.S.
customers, then U.S. domestic copyright law governs the work under
Berne Convention.198 As such, the registration requirement would not
be a prohibited formality in violation of the Convention.
On the other hand, category 2 consists of individuals and local
business owners like Sarah from the example above. These
individuals should be free to publish on the Internet without concern
for U.S. copyright formalities.
The required amendments to § 101 are minor as the following
proposed language demonstrates. Newly added language appears in
italics.
Proposed Amendments to 17 U.S.C. § 101
For purposes of Section 411, a work is a “United States
work” only if—
(1) in the case of a work first published on the Internet,
the copyright holder actively solicited customers in the
United States; or
197.
198.

See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 3, § 6.64, at 288.
See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(3).
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(2) in the case of any other published work, the work is
first published—
(A) in the United States;
(B) simultaneously in the United States and another
treaty party or parties, whose law grants a term of
copyright protection that is the same as or longer than
the term provided in the United States;
(C) simultaneously in the United States and a
foreign nation that is not a treaty party; or
(D) in a foreign nation that is not a treaty party, and
all of the authors of the work are nationals,
domiciliaries, or habitual residents of, or in the case of
an audiovisual work legal entities with headquarters in,
the United States.
The newly amended clause only comes into effect where there has
been a simultaneous Internet publication. Only then does the court
consider whether the affected party is an active solicitor or not. To
facilitate this determination this Article proposes a set of factors. The
factors involve simple factual inquiries that can readily be made in
support of summary judgment.
Proposed Factors for Determining Active Solicitation:
17 U.S.C. § 101
Each factor relates to the website on which the work was first
published. The factors weigh in favor of finding active solicitation
directed at U.S. customers. In evaluating the factors, the court need
only review the website and online advertising plan (if one existed) to
make a determination. The factors include:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Targeting U.S. customers with online advertising units
(i.e., banner ads);199
Targeting U.S. customers with USD pricing;
Enabling purchases in USD;
Providing customer support in English;

199. Online media units or banners ads can be targeted at U.S. customers to drive “click
through” to websites anywhere in the world. See Geotargeting, DOUBLECLICK,
http://support.google.com/richmedia/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2584903 (last visited Apr.
13, 2013) (“[T]he ad server uses IP addresses to determine geographic information about the
user. With this data you can set up geotargeting . . . .”).
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Providing an English version of the website.

The inquiry here is whether the web presence is designed to actively
solicit customers in the United States. Where an affected party meets
one or more of these criteria, the court may categorize the purpose of
the publication as an active solicitation of U.S. customers. As such, it
is appropriate under the proposed amendment to § 101 to treat the
foreign work as a “United States work” subject to the registration
requirement. All other works published on the Internet would no
longer be subjected to the formality of registration. In achieving this
result, U.S. copyright law would be restored to compliance with
Berne Convention in the Internet age.
V. CONCLUSION
U.S. copyright law currently imposes formalities on works of
foreign origin that are first published on the Internet, in violation of
the Berne Convention. Congress never intended to impose the
registration requirement on works of foreign origin. As such, it is time
to amend the definition of “United States work” to properly deal with
the new reality of simultaneous publication on the Internet. This
Article recommends that works of foreign origin published on the
Internet should be included in the definition of “United States works”
only when the Internet publication actively solicits customers in the
United States. All other simultaneous publications involving foreign
works should be excluded. Implementation of this solution will
eliminate the impermissible formality for the class protected by the
Berne Convention while maintaining a level playing field with
foreign competitors who avail themselves of the U.S. market.

